Lithium Rush in the Russian High North: questioning the corporate social responsibility in Sápmi

Have you paid attention in the last two years to what kind of mining projects are being promoted in the Russian Far North and where? Amid Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, sanctions disrupted Russia’s lithium supply, a crucial component of renewable energy systems and military technologies. As global demand for lithium surges, Russia has swiftly moved to develop its largest lithium deposit, Kolmozerskoye, on Indigenous Sámi lands. While the project is framed as promoting sustainability and Indigenous engagement, it raises significant concerns about the power dynamics being used to promote extractivism on the largest wilderness of Europe.

Mirkka Ollila

When the president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, ordered the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many socio-ecological challenges faced by the local populations in the Russian High North were, and still are overshadowed by the focus on the war. Shortly after the military conflict began, sanctions against Moscow caused a disruption in lithium carbonate supplies from Chile and Argentina to Russia. This vital raw material is crucial for energy storage systems, the nuclear industry, and the military sector. In practical terms, lithium is necessary for renewable energy, portable devices, electric vehicles, and drones. Therefore, lithium is considered the future cornerstone of global economies due to its growing demand (Tsivadze et al. 2023).

Currently, battery production accounts for 74% of global lithium demand, and this share is expected to increase as the energy transition gains momentum. The European Union projects that by 2030, its member states will require up to 18 times more lithium than in 2021 for electric vehicle batteries and energy storage systems. By 2050, this demand is expected to surge 60-fold within the EU alone (Morelli & Danielson 2023). Russia, recognizing lithium’s global significance and its importance for domestic needs, is positioning itself strategically in this evolving market by quickly developing its capacity to extract and process lithium, as highlighted by an interview with the Chairman of the Board of the Association of Rare and Rare Earth Metals, Igor Demidov.

A world map that shows the global distribution of lithium resources.
Image 1. Global distribution of lithium resources. Graham, J.D, Rupp, J.A, and Brungard, E. (2021). Lithium in the Green Energy Transition: The Quest for Both Sustainability and Security. Sustainability 13(20). https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/20/11274#B39-sustainability-13-11274

As Tsivadze et al. (2023) suggest, countries lacking the technology and infrastructure for lithium extraction and production will struggle to take a leading role in the future global renewable energy markets. The supply disruptions in February 2022 concretized Russia’s need to reduce its dependence on imported lithium and focus on achieving self-sufficiency, as stressed in the state-owned nuclear company Rosatom’s newsletter. However, the fulfillment of the agendas related to the production of this raw material will first trickle down to the local level, where it is extracted.

Kolmozerskoye: a new frontier in Indigenous lands

To meet the domestic demand for lithium production Russian mineral giant Nornickel (former Norilsk Nickel) and Rosatom’s mining division were granted the exclusive right to start developing the country’s largest lithium deposit, Kolmozerskoye, under their joint venture, Polar Lithium. The project quickly took off, with its official website showcasing a narrative centered on engaging with local Indigenous peoples and reindeer herders while pointing through media outlets to lithium’s role in fostering ‘a cleaner world’. According to Anastasia Lyrchikova and Polina Devitt (2024), in June 2023 the previously mentioned Polar Lithium CEO Igor Demisov said that “lithium is the oil of the 21st century”. This straightforward comparison underscores the critical role of this raw material in Russia’s current mineral extraction strategy, both domestically and internationally.

A map of land cover and natural resources in Sápmi.
Image 2. Land cover and natural resources in Sápmi. Cartography coordinator: Johanna Rato. Nordregio (2015). https://nordregio.org/maps/land-cover-and-natural-resources-in-sapmi/

The Kolmozerskoye deposit situated in the easternmost part of Sápmi on the Kola Peninsula is yet another example of a lithium project advancing on traditional Indigenous lands. According to Verónica Morelli and Luke Danielson (2023), 80% of lithium deposits are found on lands that belong to or hold significance to Indigenous peoples. While many new mining initiatives are justified precisely by the ‘green transition,’ land-use pressures, whatever their underlying causes, always threaten Arctic nature and the livelihoods and cultural practices of Indigenous peoples when they occur on their lands. Historically, natural resources have been integral to the political-economic systems of colonialism and patriarchy, which, as the narratives of green transition show, continue to shape the world. This is why such energy transition projects are often referred to as ‘green colonialism’. The present and future of the mining planning area, along with its associated socio-spatial realities therefore depend on the extractivist company’s commitment to social responsibility. In this respect, Nornickel becomes an interesting example in the context of the Kolmozerskoye deposit.

The façade of sustainability and reciprocity: corporate narratives vs. local realities

Nornickel’s reputation, within Russia and internationally, is often associated with environmental pollution and violations of Indigenous peoples’ rights. However, in the case of the Kolmozerskoye deposit (marked as a red ring in Figure 2), located in the Kola Sámi territory, the company surprisingly emphasizes reciprocity with locals and its commitment to sustainability. Since June 2022, before receiving the license for mining, the company has organized a total of 11 consultations with the Kola Sámi, Komi, and Komified Nenets reindeer herders–though the project’s English-language website mentions only six of those. The website shows mechanisms aimed at supporting Indigenous peoples’ rights, including due diligence processes, Free, Prior, and Informed Consent tools, and a grievance redress mechanism. On social media, other media outlets, and in public presentations, company representatives and the team of experts consistently speak positively about the project’s progress, carefully addressing any issues that might arise and always presenting solutions. At first glance, the project thus appears to be progressing smoothly, with local communities actively involved. However, upon closer inspection, cracks in the seemingly perfect façade begin to emerge. As I have been examining the project, I keep asking myself: what lies beneath the surface of this ‘positive’ narrative’?

Despite Nornickel’s assurances, the project raises significant concerns. It is projected to produce 45,000 tons of lithium carbonate and hydroxide annually through an open pit mine, one of the most destructive extraction methods. This approach involves the extensive removal of vegetation, topsoil, and rock, which could lead to severe environmental degradation. An open pit mine also generates vast amounts of waste and by-products, which can adversely affect the air and water quality in the reindeer herding territory where the deposit is located. It is no surprise that the Sámi are deeply concerned about the potential for severe pollution in the area and the devastating impact it could have on their way of life. The industrialization of the Kola Peninsula during the Soviet era significantly disturbed opportunities for traditional livelihoods and the use of the Sámi languages, leaving behind a lingering distrust in the intentions of industrial companies seeking to exploit the natural resources of Sápmi.

A map of Kolmozerskoye infrastructure plan.
Image 3. Kolmozerskoye infrastructure plan. Map: Mirkka Ollila.

The mine also needs infrastructure. Figure 3. shows the planned connections from Kolmozerskoye to a major motorway and railway line that will cut through the Lovozerskoye area from its northern and southern sides. Despite this, experts, none of whom are Sámi, insist that the deposit area will not directly affect Sámi ancestral and sacred sites. According to them, Kolmozerskoye is located far from populated areas, which means that it is not a priority area for traditional environmental management by Indigenous peoples, except for reindeer herding. In this respect, the experts overlook the broader concept of the importance of a healthy living environment in the Sámi cultural landscape, which is not confined to settlement.

A final example that, in my view, undermines the reality of involving the Sámi and other reindeer herders in the assessment of the socio-ecological challenges of the project is Polar Lithium’s aim to rush the development of the deposit and launch the first phase of production in pilot mode between 2026 and 2027. The initial plan aimed to complete the construction of the mining and processing complex was between 2026 and 2029. The Kolmozerskoye deposit, as Figure 3. exemplifies, will however be expensive to mine and build infrastructure, as it is located in the largest wilderness area in Europe, where there are no previously built roads, for example. It is therefore clear that the rapid start of lithium production, and thus joining the global power game of energy transition in addition to domestic needs, is of particular importance to Putin’s Russia amidst the geopolitical shifts caused by the war it launched. Given the examples mentioned above, it is not unexpected that local communities remain skeptical about the company’s claimed willingness to genuinely listen to their concerns. The current mining boom in northwestern Russia, driven by ‘green technology’, and shifted geopolitical conditions at worst thus perpetuate the models of the colonial ‘past,’ where asymmetric power relations between the Indigenous peoples and extractive industries are the norm rather than the exception.

The question arises: is Nornickel (or Polar Lithium) leveraging narratives of sustainable development, corporate social responsibility, and respect for Indigenous peoples’ rights to promote mining activities under the guise of environmental stewardship in Sápmi? This is one of the research questions of my ongoing doctoral research, which focuses on analyzing such narratives.

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September 17, 2024